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CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS
IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
F. HODGE O'NEA L, James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina,and RONALD R. JANKE, of Durham,
North Carolina

This article discusses in broad

CLASSIFICATION OF STOCK

outline the principal devices that
can be utilized to allocate control
and management powers in a close
corporation. Its objective is to give
an overall view of these control
schemes and provide "idea guides"
on how they can be used in setting
up control patterns for close corporations.
A few of the arrangements discussed may be of doubtful validity
in some states. The fact that a desired control mechanism is not
available under a local law may
be a factor for the attorney to weigh
in determining whether to incorporate in some other state, e.g., under
the Delaware corporation statute
or under the progressive and welldrafted new Michigan statute.

In most states, provision can be
made in a corporation's articles of
incorporation for several classes
of shares with different voting
power, rights to dividends, rights
on liquidation, and other qualities.
A class of shares can be made nonvoting, or its voting rights can be
made to vary according to the question under consideration. Thus, a
class of shares can be given the
right to vote only for the election
of directors, or on amendments to
articles of incorporation, or on
other fundamental corporate action. Furthermore, provision can
be made for votes on some types
of action to be by shares and on
other types of action to be by
classes.

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article appeared, in a somewhat different version, in 30 BENCH
& BAR OF MINNESOTA 19 (September 1973), published by the Minnesota State Bar

Association.
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By varying the voting powers,
dividend rights, and other qualities
of the several classes of stock and
by using different combinations
in allocating shares of the various
classes, almost any desired control
arrangement can be achieved.
An interesting question exists
under the law of some states as to
whether use can be made of a class
of stock with voting power but no
proprietary rights; that is, a class
of stock which gives the holder the
power to vote but does not bestow
any right to dividends or to share
in the assets on dissolution. An
Illinois case upheld, without the
aid of a specific statutory provision,
a class of shares with voting power
but no proprietary rights. Stroh v.
Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Ill.
2d 471, 272 N.E. 2d 1 (1971).
In an interesting Delaware decision, Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del.
Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (Sup. Ct.
1966), a corporation was owned
by two families, the Lehrmans
and the Cohens. It originally had
two classes of stocks, a class AL stock held by the Lehrmans and
a class A-C stock held by the
Cohens. Each class of stock elected
two of the four directors. Because
of the fear of deadlock-past experience in the company indicated
that corporate paralysis was likely
-the
shareholders amended the
corporation's charter to create a
third class of stock, consisting of
a single share with a ten-dollar par
value, which entitled the holder to
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elect a fifth or deadlock-breaking
director. That share of stock was
issued to the company's attorney.
He became the "swing man," able
to break an impasse between the
two families. His share of stock,
however, was callable by the corporation on the vote of four of the
five directors, which meant that
the Lehrmans and the Cohens
could eliminate him by redeeming
his share of stock. The share of
stock carried no proprietary rights,
except the right to recover ten dollars on redemption of the share of
stock or on dissolution of the corporation. The court upheld this
deadlock-breaking
arrangement.
Incidentally, the attorney, when
this litigation ended, was the company's chief executive officer.
Class Voting for Directors
In most states, stock can be classified and provision made for each
class to elect a director or a specified number of directors. Then a
separate class of stock or a majority of the shares of a class of stock
can be issued to each shareholder.
Hence, if each member of a fourman company wants to be assured
of representation on the board, four
classes of stock, identical in all
respects except that each class
elects a different director, can be
issued, one class to each shareholder. The number of directors
elected by a class can be varied by
providing, for example, that the
class of stock held by one share-

1974

CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

holder can elect two directors,
while another class owned by
another shareholder can select
three directors. An arrangement
under which all of the shares of a
class are issued to a single person
facilitates estate planning, because
he can dispose of almost half of his
stock without losing the power to
choose a director.
Where there are two groups of
shareholders, each wanting a veto
over director action, a board with
an even number of directors can
be created and each group given
a class of stock with power to elect
half of the board.
Class voting for directors is in
a sense inconsistent with a shareholder's right to vote his shares
cumulatively for directors. Compare Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d
78, 126 N.E. 2d 701 (1955), with
Humphrys v. Winous Co., 72 Ohio
L. Abst. 65, 57 Ohio Op. 44, 125
N.E. 2d 204 ( (Cuyahoga County,
1956), rev'd 165 Ohio St. 45, 133
N.E. 2d 780 (1956). Therefore,
if class voting for directors is to be
used, a provision should be included in the articles of incorporation expressly stating that shareholders in the corporation do not
have the right to vote cumulatively.
The effect of classification of
a corporation's stock and provision
for class voting for directors on the
corporation's ability to elect the
tax status provided by Subchapter
S of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954 (IRC) should be consid-
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ered. Broadly speaking, a corporation that elects Subchapter S tax
status is not subject to federal tax
on its income; instead, its income
or losses are considered for tax
purposes to be the income or losses
of its shareholders. IRC §§13711379. Among the requirements for
eligibility to elect Subchapter S
status is that the company have
only one class of stock. The Regulations provide, however, that
where several groups of shares are
identical except that each group
has a right to elect a proportionate
number of directors, the corporation will be treated as having only
one class of stock for Subchapter S
purposes. Treas. Reg. §1.371-1(g)
(1966). Thus, if a corporation issues four identical classes of stock,
each with 100 shares and each able
to choose one director, those four
classes will be considered as one
class for Subchapter S purposes.
Similarly, if a corporation has two
classes of stock with identical
characteristics, except that one
class with 100 shares outstanding
selects one director and a second
class with 200 shares outstanding
elects two directors, that arrangement also meets the one-class requirement of Subchapter S. It is
probably possible, without losing
Subchapter S eligibility, to parcel
out the shares of a class so as to
give one shareholder slightly over
half of the stock in that class and
thus power to elect a board member, but issue the other shares in
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the class to shareholders who own
other stock and are capable of
electing different directors in order
to give them additional participation in dividends and in assets on
dissolution.
An arrangement for class voting
for directors needs to be shielded
against modification by amendment
of the articles of incorporation.
Protection should also be provided
against an increase in the size of
the board of directors, and against
the issuance of additional stock
within a class that may reduce
the holder of a majority of the
shares to a minority holder of that
class.
. Some states may provide, as
does Minnesota, that articles of incorporation -may confer upon the
creditors of the corporation, or
upon a class or classes thereof, the
right to vote to the extent and subject to the limitations stated therein." Minn. Stat. Ann. §301.26(12)
(1969). On occasion, creditors, or
a particular class of creditors like
debenture holders, may be given
power to vote on corporate decisions.
HIGH VOTINC AND

QUORUM

REQUIREIENTS

Well-informed businessmen acquiring a minority interest in a
close corporation usually want
protection against the power of
majority shareholders to make unilaterally fundamental changes in
the corporation by amendment of
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the articles of incorporation, merger, and other action, and to control
corporate management through
election of the board of directors.
The principal of majority rule is
splendid, unless you own 40 percent of the stock of a close corporation while someone else owns 60
percent. A minority shareholder
typically wants a veto over some,
perhaps all, important corporate
decisions. A person coming into
a close corporation in a minority
position may have sufficient bargaining power, because the corporation badly needs his services,
patents, or other assets, to obtain
the consent of majority shareholders to setting up a veto arrangement.
In most states, a veto over
fundamental corporation action
can be accomplished by requiring
unanimity or a high vote for shareholder action. Corporation statutes
usually require shareholder approval for amendment of the articles of incorporation, merger or
consolidation, sale or disposition
of all or substantially all corporate
assets other than in the usual and
regular course of business, and voluntary dissolution. Thus, a clause
in the articles of incorporation requiring unanimity for shareholder
action on these matters gives each
shareholder an effective veto over
these basic corporate changes.
Similarly, a provision requiring approval by the holders of a high percentage of the shares can be used
30
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as well to assure a veto, as long
as the requirement is protected
against circumvention by the issuance of additional stock.
In most states, power to prevent
changes in officers or employees,
in salaries, or in the day-to-day
conduct of the business can be
given to a shareholder by requiring
unanimity or a high vote for director action and coupling that prerequisite with an arrangement that
insures the shareholder representation on the board of directors.
Representation on the board of
directors can usually be assured
a minority shareholder by:
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tories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.
2d 389 (1956) (bylaw barred directors from transacting business
while vacancy unfilled).
Perhaps a slight doubt exists
whether, absent explicit statutory
language, a provision requiring
unanimity of the shareholders, as
distinguished from the concurrence
of holders of a large proportion of
the shares, would be held valid for
these corporate actions. See Sellers
v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons, Co.,
23 Del. Ch. 13, 26, 2 A. 2d 108,
114(1938).
Where a statute does not specifically authorize a high vote requirement for some shareholder
* Executing a shareholders' agree- action, e.g., the election of direcment permitting him to designate tors or approval of voluntary liquidation, but specifically permits it
a director;
for other actions by shareholde Requiring cumulative voting for ers, the argument can be made
that, in validating greater-thanthe election of directors; or
majority requirements for specified
* Classifying the shares, provid- shareholder action, the legislature
ing for election of some directors must have intended to disapprove
higher than usual vote requireby one class of shares and other
directors by a second class of ments for other shareholder action.
shares and giving him all or a See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel,
294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829
majority of one class of stock.
(1945) (invalidating, under a formTo guard against possible board er New York statute, high vote
action while the shareholder's posi- requirements for shareholder and
tion on the board is vacant because director action.)
In some states, if a shareholder
of the death or resignation of his
representative, a clause can be in- cannot be assured representation
serted in the articles of incorpora- on the board, he can be given a
tion prohibiting board action until veto over matters ordinarily within
the vacancy has been filled. See, the province of the board of direce.g., Strong v. Fromm Labora- tors, as the selection of corporate
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officers, by transferring certain
decision-making powers in those
matters from the directors to the
shareholders and then requiring
unanimity for shareholder action.
In other states, the statutes that
confer powers on the directors are
phrased in mandatory terms and
seemingly do not contemplate provisions in the articles transferring
to the shareholders powers that
are normally within the province
of directors. See, for example,
Minn. Stat. Ann. §301.28(1)
(1 969)-"The business of a corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors."
As a rule, high vote requirements
for shareholder and director action
are preferable to high quorum requirements or to a combination of
high quorum and high vote requirements. If high quorum requirements are used, "§hareholders and
directors must be protected against
their inadvertent attendance at a
meeting that is to consider action
they oppose. Thus, the high quorum
requirement must be buttressed by
a requirement that notices of
meetings state the business that is
to be transacted. Otherwise, a
shareholder or director may attend
a meeting, help form a quorum,
and thereby permit action on a
matter which he opposes.
Furthermore, the protection furnished minority shareholders by
high quorum requirements for directors' meetings may be illusory,
because courts may decree that di-
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rectors are under a duty to attend
meetings and cannot refuse to be
present in order to block action to
which they object. In a New York
case in which a director deliberately stayed away from a board meeting in an effort to preclude the
other two directors from filling a
board vacancy with another representative of their faction, the New
York Court of Appeals-in a highly questionable decision-held that
the absent director and a shareholder supporting his acts, who
together owned 50 percent of the
corporation's stock, were estopped
from claiming that the board's action in filling the vacancy was invalid because taken at a meeting
at which a quorum was not present.
The court commented that "they
may not now complain of an irregularity which they themselves
have caused." Gearing v. Kelly,
I1 N.Y. 2d 201, 203, 182 N.E. 2d
391, 227 N.Y.S. 2d 897, 898
(1962).
Many lawyers apparently believe that the use of both high
quorum and high vote requirements
sets up a double hurdle that objectionable action must clear before
it can become operative. Actually,
this double obstacle is an illusion.
If a shareholder or director refrains from attending a meeting in
order to prevent the formation of
a quorum, he, of course, never gets
an opportunity to veto a proposal
by voting against it. In most states
it is preferable to rely solely on a
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high vote requirement. This permits
shareholders or directors in apparent disagreement to get together,
discuss their differences, and possibly discover areas of agreement
or evolve policies satisfactory to
all.
In those jurisdictions where high
vote requirements for director or
shareholder action may be of
doubtful validity, it is, of course,
prudent to "backstop" high vote
requirements with high quorum
provisions. But see Berkowitz v.
Firestone, 192 So.2d 298 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966), where the
court held that bylaws prescribing
a high vote requirement for shareholder and director action were
invalid, inter alia, because the
statute which authorized high
quorum requirements did not authorize the imposition of high vote
requirements.
A widely used method of providing a veto over important action
by officers, including the drawing
of checks and borrowing of money,
is for the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws to require for the
execution of checks, promissory
notes, and other important documents, the signatures of two or
more officers, each representing
a different shareholder or faction
of shareholders. A variation of this
type of arrangement limits a corporate officer's authority to act to
a relatively small dollar amount
or short period of time, unless he
obtains the approval of another

officer or the consent of the board
of directors.
The limitations and disadvantages of high vote requirements
must not be overlooked:
* They provide a veto and no
more; they do not enable minority
shareholders to determine policy
affirmatively and to go forward
with its execution.
* They deprive the corporation
of the flexibility it may need to
adjust to unexpected business
situations.
* Even if all the shareholders can
be expected to act in good faith,
the presence of veto arrangements
increases the chance that a deadlock will occur in the corporation's
management that will paralyze the
corporation.
e High vote requirements may
place an unscrupulous shareholder
in a position to extort unfair concessions from the other shareholders in return for his approving
beneficial corporate actions.
In deciding whether to use high
vote requirements, therefore, the
lawyer must weigh the need to
protect the interests of minority
shareholders against the desirability of retaining that freedom of
action which is beneficial to the
corporation and the shareholders
as a group.
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INCORPORATION

OR BYLAW

CLAUSES

Inclusion of "optional" provisions in the articles of incorporation and special provisions in the
bylaws can often be useful in tailoring the control pattern of a corporation. Most statutes clearly sanction such provisions. The ALlABA Model Business Corporation
Act, for example, permits a corporation's articles of incorporation
to include "Any provision, not inconsistent with law, which the
incorporators elect to set forth in
the articles of incorporation for
the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation, including
any provision restricting the transfer of shares and any provision
which under this Act is required
or permitted to be set forth in the
by-laws." ALI-ABA Model Bus.
Corp. Act §54(h) (Rev. 1969).
The bylaws "may contain any
provisions for the regulation and
management of the affairs of the
corporation not inconsistent with
law or the articles of incorporation." ALI-ABA Model Bus. Corp.
Act §27 (Rev. 1969).
A lawyer
clauses that:

may

find

useful

. Broaden the shareholders' rights
to inspect books and records and
gain access to information about
corporate affairs;
* Define and strengthen the share-
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holders' preemptive rights, which
can be a valuable protection to
shareholders of close corporations,
though they are a source of irritation in public-issue corporations;
e Impose restrictions on the transferability of the corporation's
stock;
* Provide for arbitration or other
procedures for settling disputes or
resolving deadlocks;
9 Require an increase in dividends
when compensation of executives
is increased; or
* Otherwise control the corporation's dividend policies.
Other special article of incorporation or bylaw clauses undoubtedly
will occur to resourceful and energetic draftsmen grappling with
particular business problems.
SHAREHOLDER

AGREEMENTS

Perhaps the most frequently
used control device in close corporations is a shareholders' voting
agreement or some other shareholder contract allocating control
and management powers among
the participants. All the shareholders, or only some, holders of
a majority of the shares or owners
of a substantial minority interest,
may enter into an agreement
among themselves to assure that
they continue to act together in
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making
decisions
concerning
corporate affairs.
Whenever all the shareholders
are to become parties to an agreement, minority shareholders usually want to be assured membership on the board of directors or
the power to select one or more
directors, some voice in the management of the corporation, and
protection against the power vested
in the majority by the principle of
majority rule. Holders of a controlling interest may be willing
to share their control in order to
bring into the enterprise persons
whose money, skills, or business
connections are badly needed, and
who otherwise would not buy a
minority interest in a close corporation.
Management matters most often
covered by a shareholders' agreement are the following:
o How the shares of parties to the
agreement are to be voted in elections of directors;
o Who are to be the officers of the
corporation;
o Long-term employment arrangements for some or all of the participants;
o The salaries to be paid shareholder-employees;
o The amount of time each participant must devote to the busi-
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ness, and whether he is to be
privileged to engage part time in
other activities;
e The power of one or more of the
participants to veto corporate
decisions;
* The circumstances in which
dividends are to be declared; and
* A way of resolving corporate
disputes, through an arbitration
provision or by some method for
dissolving the corporation in the
event of dissension or deadlock
among the shareholders or directors.
The validity of shareholders'
agreements, especially those that
purport to regulate matters which
are normally within the province
of the board of directors, has frequently been challenged. Contracts
that encroach on the power of the
directors, by designating corporate
officers and other key employees
and fixing the salaries to be paid
them, or specifying the circumstances under which dividends
may be declared, have met with
highly variable and inconsistent
treatment.
Many decisions have laid down
the principle that the shareholders
cannot by agreement bind themselves to select a board of directors
that will consent to be "dummies."
"Clearly the law does not permit
the stockholders to create a steril-
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ized board of directors," was the
pithy comment of the New York
Court of Appeals in Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323, 119
N.E. 559, 562 (1918). On the
other hand, a significant number
of decisions, including many recent ones, have sustained agreements deciding important matters
of corporate policy and thus taking
away from the directors a substantial part of their normal decision-making power. Many of the
contracts upheld have designated
persons to occupy corporate offices
or fixed the corporation's dividend
policy.
In some of the decisions there
are suggestions that the validity
of shareholders' agreements limiting the powers of directors may
turn on the number and importance of the functions taken from
the directors, and on the extent
to which the agreements deviate
from the statutory norm giving
corporate management to the
directors. For a discussion of the
authorities, see F. O'Neal, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS:

LAW

AND

PRAC-

§§5.16-5.20 (Callaghan, Chicago, 2d ed. 1971).
Whenever the holders of all, or
almost all, of a corporation's
shares are parties to a contract,
modern courts are disposed-and
properly so-to uphold it even
though it affects important powers
of the directors.
Most of the modem corporation
acts contain specific provisions
TICE
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dealing with the validity of shareholders' agreements. Even where
the local statute is silent on the
subject, courts are inclined to uphold a shareholders' agreement
that has a proper business purpose
even though it encroaches to some
extent on directors' powers. In
Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23
N.W. 2d 375 (1946), a shareholder
was induced to lend large sums of
money to his floundering corporation. An agreement among the
holders of a majority, but less than
all, of the corporation's shares
provided that the corporation
would not declare dividends until
it repaid the shareholder loan.
Some of the corporation's shareholders brought suit, claiming that
the agreement was invalid because
it divested the corporation's directors and officers of the right and
duty to exercise independent judgment and discretion in determining corporate policy and action.
The court upheld the agreement,
stating:
"itis not the province of courts
to emasculate the liberty of contract by enabling parties to escape
their contractual obligations on
the pretext of public policy unless
the preservation of the public welfare imperatively so demands. . ..
The practical conduct of a modern
business corporation compels a
frank recognition that an agreement by a number of stockholders
to combine their votes in order to
effectuate a particular policy is not
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of itself unlawful in the absence
of evidence of an intent to defraud
the other stockholders or to secure
a private benefit at the expense of
the corporation or the other stockholders.'" Id. at 75 and 78, 23
N.W. 2d at 379 and 380.
Voting Trusts
The voting trust is not just a
"big business" instrument, as is
sometimes supposed. It is a flexible device that can be very useful
in working out control arrangements in a close corporation.
Shareholders may create a voting trust by entering into a trust
agreement and transferring title
to their shares to voting trustees
who, in turn, issue certificates of
beneficial interest, usually called
"voting trust certificates," to the
shareholders. The trustees then
vote the shares in accordance with
the terms of the trust agreement.
Holders of a majority of the
voting shares in a close corporation can use the voting trust instead of a voting agreement as a
device for consolidating their
voting power and assuring that
their shares will be voted as a unit.
A voting trust may be selected
because it is self-executing, while
specific performance of a shareholders' agreement might not be
available and, in any event, would
involve risks and delays. On the
other hand, a voting trust may have
some disadvantages in some states,
where, by statute, voting trusts
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may be in effect for a limited
number of years, or must be open
to inspection by shareholders.
Minnesota, for example, fixes the
maximum duration of a voting
trust at 15 years, unless it was
created in connection with a corporate indebtedness, when it may
extend through the period of indebtedness. Minn. Stat. Ann.
§301.27 (1969).
Irrevocable Proxies
The parties to a shareholders'
agreement, instead of binding themselves to vote their shares as a unit
or in accordance with a predetermined plan, sometimes relinquish
their power to vote, and confer it,
in the form of an irrevocable
proxy, upon one or more of their
number or upon some person not
a party to the agreement. A proxy
may facilitate the implementation
of a voting agreement and avoid
the possibility that a suit for specific performance, with the attendant uncertainties and delays, will
be necessary to put into effect decisions reached under the agreement.
Some modern statutes, like the
ones in New York and Michigan,
state in detail the circumstances
and the procedure whereby a proxy
can be made irrevocable. In other
jurisdictions, the law has retained
all the uncertainties and subtleties
of the proxy-coupled-with-an-interest concept, the interpretation
of which has resulted in so much
litigation.
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According to the conventional
view, the "interest" which the
proxy holder must have in order
for the proxy to be irrevocable is
either a charge, lien, or some
property right in the shares themselves, or a security interest given
to protect the proxy holder for
money advanced or obligations incurred. Under this view, a "recognizable property or financial interest in the stock in respect of which
the voting power is to be exercised," which renders the proxy
irrevocable, is said to be distinguishable from "an interest in the
corporation generally" and from
"an interest in the bare voting
power or the results to be accomplished by the use of it," neither
of which suffices to make a proxy
irrevocable. See In re Chilson,
19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 A. 82
(Ch. 1933). Cf. Smith v. Biggs
Boiler Works Co., 32 Del. Ch.
147, 82 A.2d 372 (Ch. 1951).
Many decisions-perhaps in recent years, most decisions-have
held irrevocable proxies that
would have been revocable under
the traditional concept. See F.
O'Neal, CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE, §5.36 (Callaghan, Chicago, 2d ed. 1971). The
courts have achieved this result
either by departing from the
"coupled with an interest" requirement or by broadening that
concept, sometimes to such an extent that it is hardly recognizable.
Language in a number of modern
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opinions indicates that an irrevocable proxy may be sustained if:
* It is supported by consideration
moving from the proxy holder to
the maker;
* The proxy holder has changed
his position in reliance on the
proxy; or
* The proxy was given to further
or protect the interests of the proxy
holder.
The new Michigan statute provides that a proxy that is entitled
"irrevocable proxy" and states
that it is irrevocable will not be
revocable if it is held by a person
designated by or under a shareholders' voting agreement, or by
a person who has contracted to
perform services as a director, officer, or employee of the corporation, if a proxy is required by his
contract of employment. Mich.
Bus. Corp. Act, §422(d)(f)(1972).
HOLDING COMPANIES
AND PARTNERSHIPS

A group of majority shareholders in a close corporation can use
a holding company, instead of a
shareholders' voting agreement or
a voting trust, to consolidate their
voting power. In other words, the
holders of a majority of the voting
shares in company A can create
another corporation, company B,
and transfer their A shares to B in
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exchange for shares of B stock.
Thereafter, the shares of A stock
held by company B will be voted
as a unit, pursuant to directions of
B's board of directors or officers.
In a Nebraska case, four shareholders of a realty company, who
together owned a bare majority of
its stock, set up another company
to hold their shares. The charter
of the holding company provided,
among other things, that it could
not dispose of any stock it held in
the realty company unless it disposed of all of its property, after
approval of holders of at least twothirds of its stock. By virtue of this
holding company arrangement, an
individual who held a majority of
the holding company's stock was
able to exercise complete control
over both the holding company and
the realty company, even though
he had been only a minority shareholder in the realty company. In
an action for a declaratory judgment to define the rights of the two
corporations and their shareholders, the court sustained the arrangement and permitted the holding company to vote its shares of
realty company stock. Baum v.
Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197,
62 N.W. 2d 864 (1954).
A holding company can also be
used in lieu of a voting trust
temporarily to divest all, or a
majority of, the shareholders of a
corporation of their voting power
and control. A corporation borrowing money might be required
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by a lending institution as a condition to its advancing funds to the
corporation to set up a holding
company that the lender can control. The shareholders to be temporarily disenfranchised would transfer their shares to a limited-life
holding company in return for
nonvoting holding company stock,
while persons who were to acquire
temporary control would purchase
a few shares of holding company
voting stock for a modest sum.
When the holding company's
stated life expired, its nonvoting
shareholders would receive in
liquidation the shares which they
had formerly held in the operating
company.
A holding company has a number of disadvantages, however,
which will usually prevent its being
used in setting up a control pattern
for a closely held enterprise. In the
first place, the use of a holding
company entails the expense of
organizing and maintaining an
additional corporation. Further,
both the holding company and the
operating company would be disqualified to elect the tax status
provided by Subchapter S, IRC
§ 1371 (a)(2).
Participants in a closely held
corporation sometimes organize a
partnership to hold the shares
representing their interests in the
corporation. Some or all of the
share certificates representing the
ownership of the corporation can
be issued to a partnership com-
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posed of key participants in the
business; and voting of the shares
probably can be controlled by a
provision in the firm's articles of
partnership authorizing, for example, a particular partner to vote
the shares, or directing that they
be voted pursuant to the decision
of a majority of the partners. However, a partnership is seldom used,
perhaps because of uncertainty as
to the validity of a provision in the
articles of partnership controlling
the voting of the shares, or reluctance to enter into a control arrangement that can be terminated
at any time by one of the partners
exercising his right to dissolve the
partnership.
MANAGEMENT

CONlA:TS

To be distinguished from control agreements among some or all
of the shareholders are contracts
executed by the corporation itself
under which its management or the
control over certain aspects of its
operations is entrusted to a creditor or some other individual or
corporation. The contract is usually referred to as a "management
agreement" when it attempts to
vest the entire management of the
corporation or even considerable
management powers in another
corporation or individual, particularly if a substantial fee is to be
paid for these management services.
A distinction also should be
made between management agree-
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ments and the common resolutions
under which the directors temporarily delegate part of their functions to an executive committee or
to corporate officers. An arrangement giving authority to an executive committee or the corporation's
officers is always subject to the
supervision and overriding jurisdiction of the directors, who can
modify or terminate the prerogative of such a committee or officer
at any time. A management agreement, on the other hand, divests
the board of its functions for the
term provided in the contract.
Judicial opinions dealing with
the validity and effect of management agreements and other corporate contracts that vest control
of a corporation in managers other
than its duly selected directors and
officers are few in number and
rather unsatisfactory. In particular,
there seems to be a tendency in the
decisions to lump together indiscriminately cases dealing with
management contracts and those
relating to shareholders' agreements. The decisions indicate,
however, that a management contract may be subject to attack on
the following two grounds:
* The contract violates a statute
which provides that the affairs of
a corporation shall be managed by
its board of directors; and
9 The directors of a corporation,
in view of their limited term of
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office, do not have the capacity to
enter into long-term contracts that
will bind future boards for long or
indefinite periods on basic policy
or management matters.
Taking the decisions as a whole,
the validity of a contract by which
a corporation vests direction of its
affairs in another person or company seems to depend upon the
number and importance of the
powers that are delegated, the
length of time for which they are
to be held, and perhaps the purpose of the contract or the situation out of which it arose.
Management contracts that delegate substantially all management decisions to outsiders for
indefinite or extended periods of
time are usually held invalid. Thus,
a court struck down a contract between two insurance companies
that gave one the "underwriting
and executive management" of the
other for a period of 20 years.
From the terms of the agreement
and the length of time it was to
remain in effect, the court concluded that "not only managerial
powers were delegated, but the
entire policy" of one company was
to be fixed and determined by the
other. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v.
Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d
588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 893 (1930).
Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Michigan refused to specifically
enforce an agreement by a corpo-
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ration giving the purchaser of some
of its five-year convertible bonds
the right to designate a comptroller
for the corporation, and providing
that the comptroller would have
complete charge of all finances of
the company and that no expenditures should be made or authorized
without his prior approval. The
court declared the contract to be
against public policy and thus
unenforceable. Marvin v. Solventol
Chem. Products, Inc., 298 Mich.
296, 298 N.W. 782 (1941).
On the other hand, corporations
have been permitted to delegate to
outsiders, at least for a limited
period, some of the functions usually performed by their directors
and officers. An agreement employing an executive and giving
him the position of editor and
manager of a large daily newspaper with power to determine
editorial policy for a period of five
years was held to be valid. Jones
v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.
353 (1897) (all of the shareholders
and directors approved the contract; in fact, the dissenting judges
viewed it as an agreement of the
individual shareholders rather than
as a corporate contract). Further,
a contract among manufacturing
companies establishing a joint
committee with exclusive authority
to represent the parties in negotiations with employees was sustained
against a claim that it constituted
an unlawful delegation of the discretionary functions of the direc-

42

THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 20-No. 1)

tors. Dyers Bros. Golden West
Iron Works v. Central Iron Works,
182 Cal. 588, 189 P. 445 (1920).
CONCLUSION

In states that have completely
reworked their corporation acts in
recent years, such as Delaware,
New York, and Michigan, the control devices discussed here are
clearly sanctioned by statute, and
the procedures to be followed in
using the devices are carefully
spelled out. In those states, a lawyer can proceed with assurance
that the control patterns he is setting up for a corporation will not
be struck down by the courts.
In other states, useful control
devices, such as high vote requirements for shareholder and director
action, are of doubtful validity.
Nevertheless, in spite of an unfavorable statute, by careful planning and drafting, the lawyer often
can clarify legal relationships in
areas where the law is uncertain
and provide answers to control
problems that can be anticipated
easily.
Even more important than
clearing up legal ambiguities is the
thoughtful and careful tailoring of
the control devices to the needs of
the particular enterprise being
organized. The control pattern for
a close corporation should be individually developed. The ideal
control pattern will vary with the
nature and scope of the enterprise; the number of persons who

are to participate in it; the contribution in money, credit, and
services that each participant is
to make; and the business skills,
the personalities, and the preferences of the participants.
The stability of a control pattern, once established, can sometimes be affected by the transfer
of shares, buy-and-sell agreements,
and various types of buy-out arrangements. Furthermore, thought
must be given to provisions for
avoiding dissension, settling disputes, and breaking deadlocks that
may develop in the corporation's
management.
One final word of caution is
necessary.
Preoccupation with
achieving a desired control pattern
should not be permitted to result
in an inadvertent loss of important
business, tax, or legal advantages.
Inflexible control arrangements
may make if difficult for an enterprise to meet unforeseen contingencies or take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Furthermore, use of some control devices,
such as classification of shares,
may preclude the corporation's
election of the favorable tax status
authorized by Subchapter S of the
IRC. In other words, the planning
of a close corporation's control
pattern and the drafting of documents to implement those plans
should not be isolated from other
business and legal decisions that
are being made in establishing an
enterprise.
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